mirror of
https://github.com/ThearchyHelios/AgentLab.git
synced 2026-11-18 10:21:57 +00:00
a16cdf3ab1
## 文件工具可读任意文件(含加密主密钥)
sandbox_session 从请求体直接拼进工作区路径,没有任何净化。传 ".." 就能把
根目录挪出工作区,之后 _resolve 的越界检查是在这个被挪走的根下做的,等于失效:
curl -X POST /api/tools/file_read/run -d '{"sandbox_session":"..","args":{"path":".secret_key"}}'
→ {"ok":true,"content":"8UygDbx9..."} # 加密所有 provider Key 的 Fernet 主密钥
根因是同一段净化逻辑被抄了五遍:四个沙箱后端各一份,文件工具那份漏抄了。
所以提到 config.sanitize_session 统一一份,五处共用;RunToolIn.sandbox_session
再加 pattern 做纵深防御——畸形 session 直接 422,而不是悄悄净化成 default。
## 并发代码节点互相覆盖入口脚本
同一 run 的节点共用一个沙箱会话,而入口脚本写死 main.py。README 主打的
"连线即并行"会让并排的代码节点在同一 superstep 并发执行,都写 main.py 就
互相覆盖——后写的赢,每个节点却都拿到 ok=True 和"自己的"返回值。
8 路并发同 session:7/8 执行了别人的代码,error 全为 None
改成每次执行生成唯一入口脚本(__entry_<uuid>.py),跑完即删。共享工作区语义
保留,跨节点传文件照常。四个后端同构改造,实测 8/16 路并发均 0 串味。
## 顺带修掉两个自己埋的坑
- conda 迁移把沙箱解释器隔离弄丢了:conda 环境 sys.prefix == sys.base_prefix,
于是"干净解释器"挑出来的就是项目环境自己,沙箱代码能 import cryptography
直接解密落库的 Key。改成实际探测候选解释器是否看得见敏感包,都不干净就
退回 -S 关掉 site-packages。README 那句承诺现在重新成立了。
- -I 在 3.11+ 隐含 -P,脚本目录不进 sys.path,代码节点的 files 参数(多文件)
在 seatbelt/bubblewrap 下一直是坏的,import helper 直接 ModuleNotFoundError。
换成 -s -E,隔离意图不变,同目录 import 恢复。
- microvm 的 files_written 取 FsEntry.name(不存在),塞进去的是对象 repr。
改取 path 的尾段。
沙箱回归 16 项通过(两档各 8 项)。
178 lines
7.3 KiB
Python
178 lines
7.3 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
|
||
|
||
import asyncio
|
||
import os
|
||
import resource
|
||
import shutil
|
||
import sys
|
||
import time
|
||
from pathlib import Path
|
||
|
||
from app.core.config import settings, sanitize_session
|
||
from app.sandbox import interpreter
|
||
from app.sandbox.base import ENTRY_PREFIX, ExecResult, Sandbox, SandboxLimits, entry_name, truncate
|
||
|
||
# 入口脚本后缀 + 执行命令前缀(沙箱内路径在运行时拼)。文件名不能写死:
|
||
# 同会话并发执行都写 main.py 会互相覆盖。
|
||
_LANG = {
|
||
"python": (".py", None), # 运行时用 interpreter.python_argv()
|
||
"bash": (".sh", ["/bin/bash"]),
|
||
"sh": (".sh", ["/bin/sh"]),
|
||
"node": (".js", ["node"]),
|
||
"javascript": (".js", ["node"]),
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# 只读挂进沙箱的系统目录,存在才挂
|
||
_RO_BINDS = ["/usr", "/lib", "/lib64", "/bin", "/sbin", "/etc/alternatives", "/etc/ssl"]
|
||
|
||
|
||
class BubblewrapSandbox(Sandbox):
|
||
"""Linux 上的对等方案:bubblewrap(Flatpak 的沙箱内核)。
|
||
|
||
一个几百 KB 的二进制,直接用 namespace + seccomp 建隔离环境,
|
||
不需要 daemon、不需要 root、不需要镜像。相比 Seatbelt 它还多隔离了
|
||
PID、IPC 和挂载视图,隔离强度更接近容器。
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
name = "bubblewrap"
|
||
|
||
def __init__(self) -> None:
|
||
self._root = settings.workspace_dir / "bwrap"
|
||
self._bwrap = shutil.which("bwrap")
|
||
|
||
@staticmethod
|
||
def available() -> bool:
|
||
return sys.platform.startswith("linux") and shutil.which("bwrap") is not None
|
||
|
||
async def health(self) -> dict[str, object]:
|
||
ok = self.available()
|
||
return {
|
||
"backend": self.name,
|
||
"available": ok,
|
||
"isolated": ok,
|
||
"isolation": "Linux namespace(mount/pid/ipc/uts/net)+ 只读根",
|
||
"limits_note": "内存与 CPU 由 rlimit 限制;如需 cgroups 级配额请配合 systemd-run",
|
||
"enforced": {"timeout": True, "cpu": True, "memory": True, "network": True, "fsize": True},
|
||
"root": str(self._root),
|
||
"interpreter": interpreter.describe(),
|
||
**({} if ok else {"error": "未找到 bwrap,可执行 apt install bubblewrap 安装"}),
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
def _session_dir(self, session_id: str) -> Path:
|
||
# 净化规则统一在 config.sanitize_session 里,四个后端和文件工具共用一份:
|
||
# 这段逻辑以前各抄各的,文件工具那份漏抄了,就成了越界读取的口子。
|
||
path = self._root / sanitize_session(session_id)
|
||
path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||
return path
|
||
|
||
@staticmethod
|
||
def _preexec(limits: SandboxLimits): # pragma: no cover - 子进程里执行
|
||
def _apply() -> None:
|
||
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CPU, (limits.timeout, limits.timeout + 2))
|
||
# Linux 上 RLIMIT_AS 是真正生效的(macOS 不是)
|
||
nbytes = limits.memory_mb * 1024 * 1024
|
||
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (nbytes, nbytes))
|
||
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_FSIZE, (256 * 1024 * 1024,) * 2)
|
||
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CORE, (0, 0))
|
||
os.setsid()
|
||
|
||
return _apply
|
||
|
||
def _argv(self, workdir: Path, limits: SandboxLimits, cmd: list[str]) -> list[str]:
|
||
argv = [
|
||
self._bwrap or "bwrap",
|
||
"--unshare-all", # mount/pid/ipc/uts/cgroup/net 全部隔离
|
||
*(["--share-net"] if limits.network else []),
|
||
"--die-with-parent", # 父进程没了,沙箱跟着走
|
||
"--new-session", # 摘掉控制终端,防 TIOCSTI 注入
|
||
"--proc", "/proc",
|
||
"--dev", "/dev",
|
||
"--tmpfs", "/tmp",
|
||
"--bind", str(workdir), "/work",
|
||
"--chdir", "/work",
|
||
"--setenv", "HOME", "/work",
|
||
"--setenv", "TMPDIR", "/tmp",
|
||
"--setenv", "PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin",
|
||
"--setenv", "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE", "1",
|
||
]
|
||
for path in _RO_BINDS:
|
||
if Path(path).exists():
|
||
argv += ["--ro-bind", path, path]
|
||
return argv + ["--", *cmd]
|
||
|
||
async def run(
|
||
self,
|
||
code: str,
|
||
*,
|
||
language: str = "python",
|
||
limits: SandboxLimits | None = None,
|
||
session_id: str | None = None,
|
||
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
|
||
files: dict[str, str] | None = None,
|
||
) -> ExecResult:
|
||
limits = limits or SandboxLimits()
|
||
language = (language or "python").lower()
|
||
if language not in _LANG:
|
||
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"不支持的语言:{language}")
|
||
if not self.available():
|
||
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error="bwrap 不可用")
|
||
|
||
ext, cmd_prefix = _LANG[language]
|
||
# python 的命令前缀运行时才定:要挑一个看不见后端依赖的解释器
|
||
cmd_prefix = cmd_prefix if cmd_prefix is not None else interpreter.python_argv()
|
||
entry = entry_name(ext)
|
||
cmd = [*cmd_prefix, f"/work/{entry}"]
|
||
workdir = self._session_dir(session_id or f"tmp-{int(time.time() * 1000)}")
|
||
(workdir / entry).write_text(code)
|
||
for rel, content in (files or {}).items():
|
||
target = (workdir / rel).resolve()
|
||
if not str(target).startswith(str(workdir.resolve())):
|
||
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"非法文件路径:{rel}")
|
||
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||
target.write_text(content)
|
||
|
||
argv = self._argv(workdir, limits, cmd)
|
||
for key, value in (env or {}).items():
|
||
argv[1:1] = ["--setenv", key, value]
|
||
|
||
started = time.perf_counter()
|
||
try:
|
||
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
|
||
*argv,
|
||
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
|
||
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
|
||
preexec_fn=self._preexec(limits),
|
||
)
|
||
out, err = await asyncio.wait_for(proc.communicate(), timeout=limits.timeout)
|
||
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
|
||
try:
|
||
os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), 9)
|
||
except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError):
|
||
proc.kill()
|
||
await proc.wait()
|
||
return ExecResult(
|
||
ok=False, backend=self.name, timed_out=True, exit_code=124,
|
||
duration_ms=int((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000),
|
||
error=f"执行超过 {limits.timeout}s 被终止",
|
||
)
|
||
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
|
||
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}")
|
||
|
||
stdout, t1 = truncate(out.decode(errors="replace"), limits.max_output)
|
||
stderr, t2 = truncate(err.decode(errors="replace"), limits.max_output)
|
||
code_ = proc.returncode or 0
|
||
return ExecResult(
|
||
ok=code_ == 0,
|
||
exit_code=code_,
|
||
stdout=stdout,
|
||
stderr=stderr,
|
||
truncated=t1 or t2,
|
||
timed_out=code_ in (-24, 152),
|
||
backend=self.name,
|
||
duration_ms=int((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000),
|
||
files_written=[p.name for p in workdir.iterdir() if p.is_file() and not p.name.startswith(ENTRY_PREFIX)][:50],
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
async def cleanup(self, session_id: str) -> None:
|
||
await asyncio.to_thread(shutil.rmtree, self._session_dir(session_id), True)
|