Files
AgentLab/backend/app/sandbox/bubblewrap_sandbox.py
T
ThearchyHelios dead51ae56 数据目录里的文件一律先写临时文件再改名:新增 core/atomic(同目录、带随机后缀的临时文件,写完 os.replace;只该生成一次的用 os.link 建,已有就不动)
- 工件(内容寻址):以前共用 <id>.tmp,两个进程同时写同一份内容时后到的会截断先到的半成品、先到的改名又让后到的改名失败;现在各写各的临时文件
- 加密密钥 .secret_key、断言签名私钥:几个进程同时第一次启动时只建出一把,后到的读先到的那一把(以前各生成一把,各自加密、签名的东西对方认不得),文件从建出来起就是 0600
- 附件抽出文字的缓存:临时文件名带随机后缀
- 文件工具(file_write)的覆盖和追加、三种系统沙箱写进工作目录的代码和输入文件、seatbelt 的策略文件:先写临时文件再改名
- 上传表格的版本库、原件存档、记录表本来就是这样写的,不动
2026-10-19 10:01:20 +08:00

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from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import logging
import os
import resource
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from functools import lru_cache
from pathlib import Path
from app.core import atomic
from app.core.config import settings, sanitize_session
from app.core.errors import describe_exception, raw
from app.sandbox import interpreter
from app.sandbox.base import ENTRY_PREFIX, ExecResult, Sandbox, SandboxLimits, entry_name, truncate
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# 入口脚本后缀 + 执行命令前缀(沙箱内路径在运行时拼)。文件名不能写死:
# 同会话并发执行都写 main.py 会互相覆盖。
_LANG = {
"python": (".py", None), # 运行时用 interpreter.python_argv()
"bash": (".sh", ["/bin/bash"]),
"sh": (".sh", ["/bin/sh"]),
"node": (".js", ["node"]),
"javascript": (".js", ["node"]),
}
# 只读挂进沙箱的系统目录,存在才挂
_RO_BINDS = ["/usr", "/lib", "/lib64", "/bin", "/sbin", "/etc/alternatives", "/etc/ssl"]
def _on_linux() -> bool:
return sys.platform.startswith("linux")
@lru_cache(maxsize=4)
def _probe(bwrap: str) -> str:
"""真起一次 bwrap,返回失败原因;空串表示能用。
装了 bwrap 不等于建得了隔离环境:Docker 默认的 seccomp 配置不许非特权进程建
user namespace,Ubuntu 24.04 的 AppArmor 默认也限制它。以前 available() 只看
二进制在不在,于是容器里 auto 选中 bubblewrap,每次执行都报 "No permissions to
create a new namespace"——而本地子进程明明能用。
探测带上执行时同样要用的命名空间、/proc 和 /dev,任何一样建不起来都算不可用。
结果缓存:内核和容器权限在进程生命周期里不会变。
"""
argv = [
bwrap, "--unshare-all", "--die-with-parent", "--new-session",
"--ro-bind", "/", "/", "--proc", "/proc", "--dev", "/dev",
"--", shutil.which("true") or "/bin/true",
]
try:
proc = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as e:
return raw(e)
if proc.returncode == 0:
return ""
lines = [line.strip() for line in (proc.stderr or "").splitlines() if line.strip()]
return lines[-1] if lines else f"退出码 {proc.returncode}"
class BubblewrapSandbox(Sandbox):
"""Linux 上的对等方案:bubblewrap(Flatpak 的沙箱内核)。
一个几百 KB 的二进制,直接用 namespace + seccomp 建隔离环境,
不需要 daemon、不需要 root、不需要镜像。相比 Seatbelt 它还多隔离了
PID、IPC 和挂载视图,隔离强度更接近容器。
"""
name = "bubblewrap"
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._root = settings.workspace_dir / "bwrap"
self._bwrap = shutil.which("bwrap")
@staticmethod
def available() -> bool:
if not _on_linux():
return False
bwrap = shutil.which("bwrap")
return bwrap is not None and not _probe(bwrap)
@staticmethod
def probe_failure() -> str:
"""装了 bwrap 却建不起隔离环境时的原因;没装或者能用都返回空串。"""
bwrap = shutil.which("bwrap") if _on_linux() else None
return _probe(bwrap) if bwrap else ""
@classmethod
def unavailable_reason(cls) -> str:
failure = cls.probe_failure()
if failure:
return f"已安装 bwrap,但无法创建隔离环境(容器默认权限或系统策略不允许):{failure}"
return "未找到 bwrap,可执行 apt install bubblewrap 安装"
async def health(self) -> dict[str, object]:
ok = self.available()
return {
"backend": self.name,
"available": ok,
"isolated": ok,
"isolation": "Linux namespace(mount/pid/ipc/uts/net)+ 只读根",
"limits_note": "内存与 CPU 由 rlimit 限制;如需 cgroups 级配额请配合 systemd-run",
"enforced": {"timeout": True, "cpu": True, "memory": True, "network": True, "fsize": True},
"root": str(self._root),
"interpreter": interpreter.describe(),
**({} if ok else {"error": self.unavailable_reason()}),
}
def _session_dir(self, session_id: str) -> Path:
# 净化规则统一在 config.sanitize_session 里,四个后端和文件工具共用一份:
# 这段逻辑以前各抄各的,文件工具那份漏抄了,就成了越界读取的口子。
path = self._root / sanitize_session(session_id)
path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return path
@staticmethod
def _preexec(limits: SandboxLimits): # pragma: no cover - 子进程里执行
def _apply() -> None:
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CPU, (limits.timeout, limits.timeout + 2))
# Linux 上 RLIMIT_AS 是真正生效的(macOS 不是)
nbytes = limits.memory_mb * 1024 * 1024
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (nbytes, nbytes))
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_FSIZE, (256 * 1024 * 1024,) * 2)
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CORE, (0, 0))
os.setsid()
return _apply
def _argv(self, workdir: Path, limits: SandboxLimits, cmd: list[str]) -> list[str]:
argv = [
self._bwrap or "bwrap",
"--unshare-all", # mount/pid/ipc/uts/cgroup/net 全部隔离
*(["--share-net"] if limits.network else []),
"--die-with-parent", # 父进程没了,沙箱跟着走
"--new-session", # 摘掉控制终端,防 TIOCSTI 注入
"--proc", "/proc",
"--dev", "/dev",
"--tmpfs", "/tmp",
"--bind", str(workdir), "/work",
"--chdir", "/work",
"--setenv", "HOME", "/work",
"--setenv", "TMPDIR", "/tmp",
"--setenv", "PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin",
"--setenv", "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE", "1",
]
for path in _RO_BINDS:
if Path(path).exists():
argv += ["--ro-bind", path, path]
return argv + ["--", *cmd]
async def run(
self,
code: str,
*,
language: str = "python",
limits: SandboxLimits | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
files: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> ExecResult:
limits = limits or SandboxLimits()
language = (language or "python").lower()
if language not in _LANG:
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"不支持的语言:{language}")
if not self.available():
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=self.unavailable_reason())
ext, cmd_prefix = _LANG[language]
# python 的命令前缀运行时才定:要挑一个看不见后端依赖的解释器
cmd_prefix = cmd_prefix if cmd_prefix is not None else interpreter.python_argv()
entry = entry_name(ext)
cmd = [*cmd_prefix, f"/work/{entry}"]
workdir = self._session_dir(session_id or f"tmp-{int(time.time() * 1000)}")
atomic.write_text(workdir / entry, code)
for rel, content in (files or {}).items():
target = (workdir / rel).resolve()
if not str(target).startswith(str(workdir.resolve())):
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"非法文件路径:{rel}")
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
atomic.write_text(target, content)
argv = self._argv(workdir, limits, cmd)
for key, value in (env or {}).items():
argv[1:1] = ["--setenv", key, value]
started = time.perf_counter()
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
*argv,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
preexec_fn=self._preexec(limits),
)
out, err = await asyncio.wait_for(proc.communicate(), timeout=limits.timeout)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
try:
os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), 9)
except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError):
proc.kill()
await proc.wait()
return ExecResult(
ok=False, backend=self.name, timed_out=True, exit_code=124,
duration_ms=int((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000),
error=f"执行超过 {limits.timeout} 秒,已终止",
)
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
# 起进程和收输出在同一个 try 里。首行只说原因,类名和 errno 这些留给日志
logger.warning("%s 沙箱进程出错:%s", self.name, raw(e))
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"沙箱进程出错:{describe_exception(e)}")
stdout, t1 = truncate(out.decode(errors="replace"), limits.max_output)
stderr, t2 = truncate(err.decode(errors="replace"), limits.max_output)
code_ = proc.returncode or 0
return ExecResult(
ok=code_ == 0,
exit_code=code_,
stdout=stdout,
stderr=stderr,
truncated=t1 or t2,
timed_out=code_ in (-24, 152),
backend=self.name,
duration_ms=int((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000),
files_written=[p.name for p in workdir.iterdir() if p.is_file() and not p.name.startswith(ENTRY_PREFIX)][:50],
)
async def cleanup(self, session_id: str) -> None:
await asyncio.to_thread(shutil.rmtree, self._session_dir(session_id), True)