Files
AgentLab/backend/app/sandbox/bubblewrap_sandbox.py
T
ThearchyHelios 3e311ec551 第三波收尾:跨模块整合、全站扫尾、检查脚本整合;网页工具认得本机代理的 fake-ip
整合(3c-integrate)
- 公共层:跨天时长(formatSpan / formatOffset / formatLapse)、本机署名(lib/actor)、检索分类色令牌、
  数据源目录(useDatasources)收进公共层;失败说明能一次列出多个写坏的自定义工具,查询超时指到数据源的查询时限
- 管理页收尾:设置页接入统一的离开前确认;检查脚本不再把沙箱里的真实值打进输出
- 画布 ↔ 右栏:点出具印章、点节点能跳到右栏对应位置;「定位」直接聚焦到出问题的字段
- 回答流 / 问数据 / 记录页:失败信息带「去哪修」且不再被翻译两遍;协作团队的结局按执行截取;
  等审批时断流重连、而运行已在空档里跑完的,补全事件

扫尾(3c-sweep)
- 术语统一:开始运行 / 继续运行、工作流最大步数;未保存的运行统一叫「未保存的工作流」(后端新运行同步)
- 沙箱报错不再带 Python 异常类名;新增 check-tokens,未定义的 CSS 变量为 0,两个旧别名迁移后删除

检查脚本(3c-checks)
- check-ui 跟上新界面(运行列表按 data 属性找行),加上令牌与选中态的回归断言,输出里的名字打码
- 新增 check-all:按顺序跑全部检查、汇总退出码,--repeat 列出偶发项
- 单节出错只记这一节失败、不再带崩整个脚本;外壳遥测浮层「重新检测」时焦点不再掉到 body

网页工具与 fake-ip
- Clash / mihomo 一类代理开 TUN + fake-ip 时,查什么都先拿到 198.18 段的假地址,被当成内网拦截。
  新增 AGENTLAB_HTTP_TOOL_FAKE_IP_RANGES(默认空):落在段里的解析结果改向公共 DNS(DoH)核实真实地址,
  公网放行、内网照拦、核实不了按拦截处理。DoH 默认先问境外的,境内公共 DNS 会对被封锁的域名返回污染结果
- 列表型环境变量接受逗号分隔(原来注释说逗号分隔、实际只认 JSON 数组);域名解析改为异步,不再阻塞事件循环

验证(沙箱):tsc 干净,pytest 866 passed(两遍),检查脚本全绿。
2026-09-27 23:37:32 +08:00

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from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import logging
import os
import resource
import shutil
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
from app.core.config import settings, sanitize_session
from app.core.errors import describe_exception, raw
from app.sandbox import interpreter
from app.sandbox.base import ENTRY_PREFIX, ExecResult, Sandbox, SandboxLimits, entry_name, truncate
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# 入口脚本后缀 + 执行命令前缀(沙箱内路径在运行时拼)。文件名不能写死:
# 同会话并发执行都写 main.py 会互相覆盖。
_LANG = {
"python": (".py", None), # 运行时用 interpreter.python_argv()
"bash": (".sh", ["/bin/bash"]),
"sh": (".sh", ["/bin/sh"]),
"node": (".js", ["node"]),
"javascript": (".js", ["node"]),
}
# 只读挂进沙箱的系统目录,存在才挂
_RO_BINDS = ["/usr", "/lib", "/lib64", "/bin", "/sbin", "/etc/alternatives", "/etc/ssl"]
class BubblewrapSandbox(Sandbox):
"""Linux 上的对等方案:bubblewrap(Flatpak 的沙箱内核)。
一个几百 KB 的二进制,直接用 namespace + seccomp 建隔离环境,
不需要 daemon、不需要 root、不需要镜像。相比 Seatbelt 它还多隔离了
PID、IPC 和挂载视图,隔离强度更接近容器。
"""
name = "bubblewrap"
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._root = settings.workspace_dir / "bwrap"
self._bwrap = shutil.which("bwrap")
@staticmethod
def available() -> bool:
return sys.platform.startswith("linux") and shutil.which("bwrap") is not None
async def health(self) -> dict[str, object]:
ok = self.available()
return {
"backend": self.name,
"available": ok,
"isolated": ok,
"isolation": "Linux namespace(mount/pid/ipc/uts/net)+ 只读根",
"limits_note": "内存与 CPU 由 rlimit 限制;如需 cgroups 级配额请配合 systemd-run",
"enforced": {"timeout": True, "cpu": True, "memory": True, "network": True, "fsize": True},
"root": str(self._root),
"interpreter": interpreter.describe(),
**({} if ok else {"error": "未找到 bwrap,可执行 apt install bubblewrap 安装"}),
}
def _session_dir(self, session_id: str) -> Path:
# 净化规则统一在 config.sanitize_session 里,四个后端和文件工具共用一份:
# 这段逻辑以前各抄各的,文件工具那份漏抄了,就成了越界读取的口子。
path = self._root / sanitize_session(session_id)
path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return path
@staticmethod
def _preexec(limits: SandboxLimits): # pragma: no cover - 子进程里执行
def _apply() -> None:
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CPU, (limits.timeout, limits.timeout + 2))
# Linux 上 RLIMIT_AS 是真正生效的(macOS 不是)
nbytes = limits.memory_mb * 1024 * 1024
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (nbytes, nbytes))
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_FSIZE, (256 * 1024 * 1024,) * 2)
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CORE, (0, 0))
os.setsid()
return _apply
def _argv(self, workdir: Path, limits: SandboxLimits, cmd: list[str]) -> list[str]:
argv = [
self._bwrap or "bwrap",
"--unshare-all", # mount/pid/ipc/uts/cgroup/net 全部隔离
*(["--share-net"] if limits.network else []),
"--die-with-parent", # 父进程没了,沙箱跟着走
"--new-session", # 摘掉控制终端,防 TIOCSTI 注入
"--proc", "/proc",
"--dev", "/dev",
"--tmpfs", "/tmp",
"--bind", str(workdir), "/work",
"--chdir", "/work",
"--setenv", "HOME", "/work",
"--setenv", "TMPDIR", "/tmp",
"--setenv", "PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin",
"--setenv", "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE", "1",
]
for path in _RO_BINDS:
if Path(path).exists():
argv += ["--ro-bind", path, path]
return argv + ["--", *cmd]
async def run(
self,
code: str,
*,
language: str = "python",
limits: SandboxLimits | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
files: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> ExecResult:
limits = limits or SandboxLimits()
language = (language or "python").lower()
if language not in _LANG:
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"不支持的语言:{language}")
if not self.available():
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error="bwrap 不可用")
ext, cmd_prefix = _LANG[language]
# python 的命令前缀运行时才定:要挑一个看不见后端依赖的解释器
cmd_prefix = cmd_prefix if cmd_prefix is not None else interpreter.python_argv()
entry = entry_name(ext)
cmd = [*cmd_prefix, f"/work/{entry}"]
workdir = self._session_dir(session_id or f"tmp-{int(time.time() * 1000)}")
(workdir / entry).write_text(code)
for rel, content in (files or {}).items():
target = (workdir / rel).resolve()
if not str(target).startswith(str(workdir.resolve())):
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"非法文件路径:{rel}")
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
target.write_text(content)
argv = self._argv(workdir, limits, cmd)
for key, value in (env or {}).items():
argv[1:1] = ["--setenv", key, value]
started = time.perf_counter()
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
*argv,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
preexec_fn=self._preexec(limits),
)
out, err = await asyncio.wait_for(proc.communicate(), timeout=limits.timeout)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
try:
os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), 9)
except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError):
proc.kill()
await proc.wait()
return ExecResult(
ok=False, backend=self.name, timed_out=True, exit_code=124,
duration_ms=int((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000),
error=f"执行超过 {limits.timeout}s 被终止",
)
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
# 起进程和收输出在同一个 try 里。首行只说原因,类名和 errno 这些留给日志
logger.warning("%s 沙箱进程出错:%s", self.name, raw(e))
return ExecResult(ok=False, backend=self.name, error=f"沙箱进程出错:{describe_exception(e)}")
stdout, t1 = truncate(out.decode(errors="replace"), limits.max_output)
stderr, t2 = truncate(err.decode(errors="replace"), limits.max_output)
code_ = proc.returncode or 0
return ExecResult(
ok=code_ == 0,
exit_code=code_,
stdout=stdout,
stderr=stderr,
truncated=t1 or t2,
timed_out=code_ in (-24, 152),
backend=self.name,
duration_ms=int((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000),
files_written=[p.name for p in workdir.iterdir() if p.is_file() and not p.name.startswith(ENTRY_PREFIX)][:50],
)
async def cleanup(self, session_id: str) -> None:
await asyncio.to_thread(shutil.rmtree, self._session_dir(session_id), True)