安全响应头:所有 HTTP 响应补 nosniff、Referrer-Policy 和 CSP frame-ancestors,页面只上报严格的 script-src

以前服务端一个安全头都不发,任何站点都能把 AgentLab 嵌进 iframe:同站门户(Lax 会话 cookie 会随请求带上)和关登录的部署
都有被点击劫持的可能,也没有「允许谁嵌」的白名单可配。

- 新增 app/web_security.py,纯 ASGI 中间件,main.py 里加在最外层:CORS 预检、登录检查自己回的 401 / 403 也带上;
  WebSocket 不经过它;接口自己设过的同名头(文件下载的 nosniff)不覆盖、不重复
- frame-ancestors 缺省只有 'self',这时另加 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN;AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS 配了同站门户的白名单时
  只发 CSP(XFO 写不了白名单,两个都发会让只认 XFO 的老浏览器把门户也拦掉)
- 分享页 /s 只认 AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS、Referrer-Policy 用 no-referrer。分享链接第 3 波才加,这一波先把配置读进来、
  头的规则写好
- 严格的 script-src 先只发 Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only:mount_web 启动时给构建产物 index.html 里的内联主题
  脚本算 sha256,只在页面响应上发;接口返回的 HTML(导出的报告自带 meta CSP)不发、不动。观察一个版本没有误报再强制执行
- HSTS 交给终结 https 的反向代理
- 两个白名单只收「协议://主机[:端口]」(可以 *. 开头),带路径、裸 *、没写协议的启动时就报错;deploy/agentlab.env 写明
  两个变量和缺省行为

测试 tests/test_web_security.py:页面、/api、中间件自己的 401、CORS 预检都带头;白名单生效时不发 XFO;/s 的规则;
上报策略只在页面上、哈希对得上;已有的头不重复;WebSocket 不受影响;白名单写错启动报错;子进程起真实的 app.main 核对
环境变量接线。
This commit is contained in:
ThearchyHelios
2026-10-16 10:17:37 +08:00
parent 4819b21269
commit a05efbf27a
6 changed files with 381 additions and 3 deletions
+32 -2
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@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
import re
from functools import lru_cache
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Annotated
from typing import Annotated, Any
from pydantic import field_validator
from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, NoDecode, SettingsConfigDict
@@ -11,6 +12,9 @@ from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, NoDecode, SettingsConfigDict
BACKEND_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
PROJECT_DIR = BACKEND_DIR.parent
#: 嵌入白名单里一项的主机部分:域名(可以 *. 开头)或方括号里的 IPv6,可以带端口;不许路径、查询、用户名
_ORIGIN_HOST = re.compile(r"(?:\*\.)?(?:[A-Za-z0-9-]+\.)*[A-Za-z0-9-]+(?::\d{1,5})?|\[[0-9A-Fa-f:.]+\](?::\d{1,5})?")
# session_id 拼进路径前必须过这一关。允许的字符刻意收得很窄:字母数字加
# 连字符下划线——点号也不放行,免得出现 ".." 这种能往上走的名字。
_SESSION_MAX = 64
@@ -64,6 +68,13 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
# 不设时按请求的 Host 拼
public_url: str = ""
# --- 安全响应头(app/web_security.py)---
# 允许哪些站点用 iframe 嵌整站(同站的门户,如 https://portal.example.com),逗号分隔。本站自己总是允许的。
# 不设时只有本站能嵌(frame-ancestors 'self',另加 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN)
frame_ancestors: Annotated[list[str], NoDecode] = []
# 分享页(/s)允许被哪些站点嵌,逗号分隔,写法同上。分享页只认这一项,不认上面那一项
embed_origins: Annotated[list[str], NoDecode] = []
# --- 沙箱 ---
sandbox_backend: str = "auto" # auto | microvm | seatbelt | bubblewrap | local | off
sandbox_timeout: int = 30
@@ -121,7 +132,8 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
"https://223.5.5.5/resolve",
]
@field_validator("http_tool_allowlist", "http_tool_fake_ip_ranges", "http_tool_doh_urls", mode="before")
@field_validator("http_tool_allowlist", "http_tool_fake_ip_ranges", "http_tool_doh_urls", "frame_ancestors",
"embed_origins", mode="before")
@classmethod
def _comma_list(cls, value: object) -> object:
# 环境变量里写逗号分隔;也兼容 JSON 数组的写法
@@ -134,6 +146,24 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
return [part.strip() for part in text.split(",") if part.strip()]
return value
@field_validator("frame_ancestors", "embed_origins")
@classmethod
def _valid_origins(cls, value: list[str], info: Any) -> list[str]:
# 只收「协议://主机[:端口]」,主机可以写 *.example.com。路径、裸 *、没写协议的写错了启动时就报出来,别到嵌入
# 失败(或者整站被谁都能嵌)才发现。'self' 本来就有,写了也不重复
name = f"AGENTLAB_{(info.field_name or '').upper()}"
out: list[str] = []
for raw in value:
item = raw.strip().rstrip("/")
if item == "'self'":
continue
scheme, _, host = item.partition("://")
if scheme.lower() not in ("http", "https") or not _ORIGIN_HOST.fullmatch(host):
raise ValueError(f"{name} 里的「{raw}」需要写成「协议://主机」(可以带端口),例如 https://portal.example.com")
if (origin := f"{scheme.lower()}://{host.lower()}") not in out:
out.append(origin)
return out
@field_validator("auth_cookie_secure", mode="before")
@classmethod
def _blank_is_auto(cls, value: object) -> object:
+3
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@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ from app.core.config import settings
from app.db.base import init_db
from app.engine.runner import run_manager
from app.seed import seed_defaults
from app.web_security import SecurityHeaders
logging.basicConfig(
level=logging.INFO,
@@ -192,6 +193,8 @@ app.add_middleware(
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# 安全响应头(app/web_security.py):最后加、在最外层,CORS 预检和登录检查自己回的 401 / 403 也带上
app.add_middleware(SecurityHeaders)
# 路由级权限(§3.12)。关登录时这些依赖全部放行;开了登录,中间件先挡掉没登录的,这里再按角色和运行挡
_BUILDER = [require_role("builder")]
+10 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@
- /api 下不存在的路径照旧是 JSON 404。排除 /api 写在路由的路径规则里,不在处理函数里判断——
否则 POST /api/不存在 会因为「路径对上了、方法不对」变成 405;
- 只注册 GET / HEAD 的 HTTP 路由,WebSocket 不经过这里;
- index.html 不缓存,发版后刷新即生效;assets/ 下的文件名带内容哈希,长缓存。
- index.html 不缓存,发版后刷新即生效;assets/ 下的文件名带内容哈希,长缓存;
- index.html 另带严格 script-src 的上报策略(Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only):启动时按构建产物里的内联脚本算
sha256(web_security.script_policy),只上报、不拦。其余安全头由 web_security 的中间件统一补。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -20,6 +22,8 @@ from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
from starlette.convertors import Convertor, register_url_convertor
from app.web_security import REPORT_ONLY_HEADER, script_policy
_NO_CACHE = "no-cache"
_IMMUTABLE = "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
@@ -72,7 +76,12 @@ def mount_web(app: FastAPI, dist: Path) -> None:
"先构建前端(cd frontend && pnpm build),或者去掉这个设置"
)
# 哈希按启动这一刻的 index.html 算:换了构建产物要重启服务,哈希才跟着换(只上报不拦,对不上也只多几条上报)
page_headers = {"Cache-Control": _NO_CACHE, REPORT_ONLY_HEADER: script_policy(index.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))}
def respond(target: Path, *, immutable: bool = False) -> FileResponse:
if target in (index, index.resolve()):
return FileResponse(target, media_type=_media_type(target), headers=page_headers)
return FileResponse(
target,
media_type=_media_type(target),
+90
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
"""安全响应头(04 细案 C1):页面不能被别的站点套进 iframe 诱导点击,浏览器不按内容猜类型,链接不把完整地址带给别的站点。
以前服务端一个安全头都不发:任何站点都能把 AgentLab 嵌进 iframe。同站的门户页面(SameSite=Lax 的会话 cookie 会随请求
带上)和关登录的部署,都有被点击劫持的可能;也没有一条「允许谁嵌」的白名单可配。
纯 ASGI 中间件(同 auth/middleware.py,main.py 里加在最外层):在 http.response.start 上补头,WebSocket 不经过它。
所有 HTTP 响应(页面、/api、登录检查自己回的 401 / 403、CORS 预检)都补:
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff;
- Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin(分享页 /s 用 no-referrer:分享的 key 在地址的 # 后面,本来不随
Referer 走,这里再收一道);
- Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors。缺省只有 'self';AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS 列出允许嵌整站的同站门户;分享页
/s 只认 AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS(分享链接第 3 波才加,路由在那时挂,头的规则先在这里定好);
- 只有 frame-ancestors 是 'self' 时另加 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN,给不认 CSP 的老浏览器。XFO 写不了白名单,有白名单
时只发 CSP:两个都发的话,只认 XFO 的老浏览器会把白名单里的门户也拦掉(认 CSP 的浏览器以 frame-ancestors 为准)。
接口自己设过的同名头(文件下载的 nosniff)不覆盖、不重复。
严格的 script-src 先只上报、不拦(Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only):页面里有一段首帧前定主题的内联脚本,强制执行
的话写错一个哈希页面就会先闪一帧深色,构建会不会产出别的内联内容也没核实。所以 mount_web(app/web.py)启动时给构建产物
index.html 里的内联脚本算 sha256(script_policy),只在页面这一个响应上发;观察一个版本没有误报,再改成强制执行。没配
上报地址:违规只在浏览器的控制台里看得到。接口返回的 HTML(导出的报告、可验证报告)文件里自带 meta CSP,不发它,也不动。
HSTS 交给终结 https 的反向代理:这里不知道对外是不是 https、要不要连子域名一起管,发错了浏览器会按 max-age 记很久,
撤不回来。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import hashlib
import re
from typing import Any
#: 分享页的路径(/s#<分享 key>):只认 /s 这一段,/settings、/studio 不算
SHARE_PATH = "/s"
_SELF = "'self'"
_DEFAULT_REFERRER = b"strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
_SHARE_REFERRER = b"no-referrer"
#: 页面里不带 src 的 <script>:要算哈希的内联脚本
_INLINE_SCRIPT = re.compile(r"<script\b(?![^>]*\bsrc\s*=)[^>]*>(.*?)</script\s*>", re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL)
REPORT_ONLY_HEADER = "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only"
def is_share_path(path: str) -> bool:
return path == SHARE_PATH or path.startswith(SHARE_PATH + "/")
def frame_policy(origins: list[str]) -> tuple[bytes, bool]:
"""(CSP 的值, 要不要另加 X-Frame-Options)。origins 是白名单(config 里校验过、去掉了 'self')。"""
sources = [_SELF, *[o for o in origins if o != _SELF]]
return f"frame-ancestors {' '.join(sources)}".encode(), len(sources) == 1
def script_policy(html: str) -> str:
"""页面的严格 script-src:本站的脚本文件('self')加上页面里每段内联脚本的 sha256(按原文的 UTF-8 字节算,同浏览器)。"""
hashes = [base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(body.encode()).digest()).decode()
for body in _INLINE_SCRIPT.findall(html)]
return " ".join(["script-src", _SELF, *(f"'sha256-{h}'" for h in dict.fromkeys(hashes))])
class SecurityHeaders:
"""frame_ancestors / embed_origins 不传时取 core/config 的 AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS、AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS(测试传别的)。"""
def __init__(self, app: Any, *, frame_ancestors: list[str] | None = None,
embed_origins: list[str] | None = None) -> None:
from app.core.config import settings
self.app = app
self.site = frame_policy(settings.frame_ancestors if frame_ancestors is None else frame_ancestors)
self.share = frame_policy(settings.embed_origins if embed_origins is None else embed_origins)
async def __call__(self, scope: dict[str, Any], receive: Any, send: Any) -> None:
if scope["type"] != "http":
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
return
share = is_share_path(scope.get("path") or "")
frame, xfo = self.share if share else self.site
wanted = [(b"x-content-type-options", b"nosniff"),
(b"referrer-policy", _SHARE_REFERRER if share else _DEFAULT_REFERRER),
(b"content-security-policy", frame)]
if xfo:
wanted.append((b"x-frame-options", b"SAMEORIGIN"))
async def send_with_headers(message: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
headers = list(message.get("headers") or [])
present = {name.lower() for name, _ in headers}
headers += [(name, value) for name, value in wanted if name not in present]
message = {**message, "headers": headers}
await send(message)
await self.app(scope, receive, send_with_headers)
+235
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@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
"""安全响应头(04 细案 C1):app/web_security.py 的纯 ASGI 中间件,加上 mount_web 给页面算内联脚本的哈希。
要守住的:
- 页面、/api 的响应(连同登录检查自己回的 401)都带 nosniff、Referrer-Policy 和 CSP frame-ancestors;
- frame-ancestors 缺省 'self',只有 'self' 时另加 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN;配了 AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS 白名单时
以 CSP 为准、不发 XFO(XFO 写不了白名单,两个都发的话老浏览器按 XFO 把白名单里的门户也拦了);
- 分享页 /s 用 AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS、Referrer-Policy: no-referrer(路由第 3 波才加,头的规则先守住);
- 严格的 script-src 只发 Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only,只在页面(index.html)上发,哈希就是构建产物里内联
脚本的 sha256;接口返回的 HTML(导出的报告自带 meta CSP)不带它;
- 接口自己设过的同名头不覆盖、不重复;WebSocket 不经过它;
- 白名单写错了启动时就报错。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import hashlib
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import httpx
import pytest
from fastapi import APIRouter, FastAPI, WebSocket
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, Response
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.core.config import BACKEND_DIR, PROJECT_DIR, Settings
from app.main import app as main_app
from app.web_security import SecurityHeaders
from tests.fakes import auth_env
THEME = "\n try { document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-theme', 'light') } catch (e) {}\n "
INDEX = ("<!doctype html><html><head><script>" + THEME + "</script>"
"<script type=\"module\" crossorigin src=\"/assets/index-AbC123.js\"></script></head>"
"<body><div id=root></div></body></html>")
HASH = base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(THEME.encode()).digest()).decode()
REPORT = ("<!doctype html><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Security-Policy\" content=\"default-src 'none'\">"
"<script>console.log('report')</script>")
@pytest.fixture
def dist(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
root = tmp_path / "dist"
(root / "assets").mkdir(parents=True)
(root / "index.html").write_text(INDEX)
(root / "assets" / "index-AbC123.js").write_text("console.log('bundle')")
return root
def _app(dist: Path | None = None, **config) -> FastAPI:
app = FastAPI()
api = APIRouter(prefix="/api")
@api.get("/ping")
async def ping() -> dict[str, str]:
return {"pong": "1"}
@api.get("/report.html")
async def report() -> HTMLResponse:
return HTMLResponse(REPORT)
@api.get("/download")
async def download() -> Response:
# 文件下载自己设了 nosniff(api/files.py):不能再加一份
return Response(b"x", headers={"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff", "Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer"})
@api.websocket("/echo")
async def echo(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
await ws.accept()
await ws.send_text(await ws.receive_text())
await ws.close()
app.include_router(api)
if dist is not None:
from app.web import mount_web
mount_web(app, dist)
app.add_middleware(SecurityHeaders, **config)
return app
async def _get(app: FastAPI, path: str) -> httpx.Response:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.ASGITransport(app=app), base_url="http://t") as client:
return await client.get(path)
def _single(r: httpx.Response, name: str) -> str | None:
values = r.headers.get_list(name)
assert len(values) <= 1, f"{name} 发了 {len(values)} 份:{values}"
return values[0] if values else None
async def test_api_and_page_carry_the_defaults(dist: Path) -> None:
app = _app(dist, frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[])
for path in ("/api/ping", "/api/nope", "/", "/studio", "/assets/index-AbC123.js"):
r = await _get(app, path)
assert _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff", path
assert _single(r, "referrer-policy") == "strict-origin-when-cross-origin", path
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'", path
assert _single(r, "x-frame-options") == "SAMEORIGIN", path
async def test_report_only_script_policy_is_only_on_the_page(dist: Path) -> None:
app = _app(dist, frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[])
for path in ("/", "/studio", "/runs/abc/evidence"):
r = await _get(app, path)
assert r.text == INDEX
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy-report-only") == f"script-src 'self' 'sha256-{HASH}'", path
# 脚本文件、接口不带;接口返回的 HTML(导出的报告)自带 meta CSP,不加一份对不上哈希的上报策略,正文原样
for path in ("/assets/index-AbC123.js", "/api/ping", "/api/report.html"):
r = await _get(app, path)
assert "content-security-policy-report-only" not in r.headers, path
r = await _get(app, "/api/report.html")
assert r.text == REPORT
async def test_whitelist_wins_and_drops_x_frame_options() -> None:
app = _app(frame_ancestors=["https://portal.example.com", "https://*.corp.example"], embed_origins=[])
r = await _get(app, "/api/ping")
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == \
"frame-ancestors 'self' https://portal.example.com https://*.corp.example"
assert "x-frame-options" not in r.headers, "有白名单时以 CSP 为准:XFO 写不了白名单"
async def test_share_page_uses_the_embed_origins(dist: Path) -> None:
app = _app(dist, frame_ancestors=["https://portal.example.com"], embed_origins=["https://bi.example.org"])
for path in ("/s", "/s/", "/s/anything"):
r = await _get(app, path)
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self' https://bi.example.org", path
assert _single(r, "referrer-policy") == "no-referrer", path
assert "x-frame-options" not in r.headers, path
# 只认 /s 这一段:/settings、/studio 照整站的规则
for path in ("/settings", "/studio", "/share"):
r = await _get(app, path)
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self' https://portal.example.com", path
assert _single(r, "referrer-policy") == "strict-origin-when-cross-origin", path
# 没配嵌入白名单:分享页只能被本站嵌,同样另加 XFO
r = await _get(_app(dist, frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[]), "/s")
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'"
assert _single(r, "x-frame-options") == "SAMEORIGIN"
async def test_headers_already_set_are_kept() -> None:
r = await _get(_app(frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[]), "/api/download")
assert _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
assert _single(r, "referrer-policy") == "no-referrer"
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'"
def test_websocket_is_not_touched() -> None:
with TestClient(_app(frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[])) as client:
with client.websocket_connect("/api/echo") as ws:
ws.send_text("hi")
assert ws.receive_text() == "hi"
async def test_main_app_and_its_own_refusals_carry_the_headers() -> None:
"""真实的 app.main:加在最外层,登录检查自己回的 401、CORS 预检也带。"""
app = main_app
r = await _get(app, "/api/health")
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'"
assert _single(r, "x-frame-options") == "SAMEORIGIN" and _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
await auth_env.reset()
try:
await auth_env.turn_on_local()
r = await _get(app, "/api/workflows")
assert r.status_code == 401 and r.json()["code"] == "auth_required"
assert _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'"
finally:
await auth_env.reset()
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.ASGITransport(app=app), base_url="http://t") as client:
r = await client.options("/api/health", headers={"Origin": "http://localhost:5273",
"Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET"})
assert r.status_code == 200 and _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
def test_origin_lists_parse_and_bad_entries_fail_at_startup(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.delenv("AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS", raising=False)
assert Settings().frame_ancestors == [] and Settings().embed_origins == []
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS", " https://portal.example.com/ , https://*.corp.example,'self'")
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS", '["http://bi.example.org:8080"]')
got = Settings()
assert got.frame_ancestors == ["https://portal.example.com", "https://*.corp.example"], "末尾的 / 去掉,'self' 本来就有"
assert got.embed_origins == ["http://bi.example.org:8080"]
monkeypatch.delenv("AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS")
# 只收「协议://主机[:端口]」:路径、通配一切、没写协议、'none' 这类写法启动时就报出来,别到嵌入失败才发现
for bad in ("*", "portal.example.com", "https://portal.example.com/app", "ftp://portal.example.com", "'none'",
"https://", "https://portal.example.com?x=1"):
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS", bad)
with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS"):
Settings()
def test_deploy_env_documents_both_lists() -> None:
text = (PROJECT_DIR / "deploy" / "agentlab.env").read_text()
assert "# AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS=" in text and "# AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS=" in text
_PROBE = r"""
import asyncio, json, httpx
from app.main import app
async def main():
t = httpx.ASGITransport(app=app)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=t, base_url="http://t") as c:
out = {}
for p in ("/", "/api/health"):
r = await c.get(p)
out[p] = {k: r.headers.get(k) for k in ("content-security-policy", "x-frame-options",
"content-security-policy-report-only")}
print(json.dumps(out))
asyncio.run(main())
"""
def test_main_app_reads_the_whitelist_and_hashes_the_page(dist: Path, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""真实的 app.main:环境变量里的白名单生效、不发 XFO;托管页面时 index.html 带上报策略。settings、app 都是模块级
单例,起一个子进程导入。"""
env = {**os.environ, "AGENTLAB_DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "data"), "AGENTLAB_WEB_DIST": str(dist),
"AGENTLAB_SECRET_KEY": "test-only-not-a-real-key", "AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS": "https://portal.example.com"}
proc = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", _PROBE], cwd=BACKEND_DIR, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True,
timeout=120)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr[-2000:]
out = json.loads(proc.stdout.strip().splitlines()[-1])
for path in ("/", "/api/health"):
assert out[path]["content-security-policy"] == "frame-ancestors 'self' https://portal.example.com", path
assert out[path]["x-frame-options"] is None, path
assert out["/"]["content-security-policy-report-only"] == f"script-src 'self' 'sha256-{HASH}'"
assert out["/api/health"]["content-security-policy-report-only"] is None
+11
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,17 @@ BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
# 会话 cookie 是否带 Secure:留空按请求是不是 https 决定;反向代理终结了 https 时填 true
# AGENTLAB_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=
# ---- 嵌入(可选)----
# 默认只有 AgentLab 自己能把页面放进 iframe(响应头 Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self',另加
# X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN),别的站点嵌进去会被浏览器拦下,防点击劫持。HSTS 不在这里加,交给终结 https 的反向代理。
# 同站的门户(和 AgentLab 在同一个可注册域名下,比如 portal.example.internal 和 agentlab.example.internal)要嵌整站时,
# 把门户的地址写在下面,逗号分隔,只写 协议://主机[:端口],主机可以写 *.example.internal。填了之后只发
# frame-ancestors、不再发 X-Frame-Options。登录用的 cookie 只随同站的请求带上,跨站的门户嵌整站登录不了。
# 写错了(带路径、没写协议、只写 *)服务启动时报错。
# AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS=https://portal.example.internal
# 分享页(/s)允许被哪些站点嵌,写法同上。分享页只认这一项、不认上面那一项。分享链接还没有上线,现在填了不起作用
# AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS=https://bi.example.internal
# ---- 数据 ----
# 数据目录:数据库、执行断点、上传的文件、沙箱工作区,还有加密密钥 .secret_key 都在这里。
# 要备份的就是这个目录(丢了 .secret_key,存进去的 API Key 就解不开了)。