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安全响应头:所有 HTTP 响应补 nosniff、Referrer-Policy 和 CSP frame-ancestors,页面只上报严格的 script-src
以前服务端一个安全头都不发,任何站点都能把 AgentLab 嵌进 iframe:同站门户(Lax 会话 cookie 会随请求带上)和关登录的部署 都有被点击劫持的可能,也没有「允许谁嵌」的白名单可配。 - 新增 app/web_security.py,纯 ASGI 中间件,main.py 里加在最外层:CORS 预检、登录检查自己回的 401 / 403 也带上; WebSocket 不经过它;接口自己设过的同名头(文件下载的 nosniff)不覆盖、不重复 - frame-ancestors 缺省只有 'self',这时另加 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN;AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS 配了同站门户的白名单时 只发 CSP(XFO 写不了白名单,两个都发会让只认 XFO 的老浏览器把门户也拦掉) - 分享页 /s 只认 AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS、Referrer-Policy 用 no-referrer。分享链接第 3 波才加,这一波先把配置读进来、 头的规则写好 - 严格的 script-src 先只发 Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only:mount_web 启动时给构建产物 index.html 里的内联主题 脚本算 sha256,只在页面响应上发;接口返回的 HTML(导出的报告自带 meta CSP)不发、不动。观察一个版本没有误报再强制执行 - HSTS 交给终结 https 的反向代理 - 两个白名单只收「协议://主机[:端口]」(可以 *. 开头),带路径、裸 *、没写协议的启动时就报错;deploy/agentlab.env 写明 两个变量和缺省行为 测试 tests/test_web_security.py:页面、/api、中间件自己的 401、CORS 预检都带头;白名单生效时不发 XFO;/s 的规则; 上报策略只在页面上、哈希对得上;已有的头不重复;WebSocket 不受影响;白名单写错启动报错;子进程起真实的 app.main 核对 环境变量接线。
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
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from __future__ import annotations
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import ipaddress
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import re
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from functools import lru_cache
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Annotated
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from typing import Annotated, Any
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from pydantic import field_validator
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from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, NoDecode, SettingsConfigDict
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@@ -11,6 +12,9 @@ from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, NoDecode, SettingsConfigDict
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BACKEND_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
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PROJECT_DIR = BACKEND_DIR.parent
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#: 嵌入白名单里一项的主机部分:域名(可以 *. 开头)或方括号里的 IPv6,可以带端口;不许路径、查询、用户名
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_ORIGIN_HOST = re.compile(r"(?:\*\.)?(?:[A-Za-z0-9-]+\.)*[A-Za-z0-9-]+(?::\d{1,5})?|\[[0-9A-Fa-f:.]+\](?::\d{1,5})?")
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# session_id 拼进路径前必须过这一关。允许的字符刻意收得很窄:字母数字加
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# 连字符下划线——点号也不放行,免得出现 ".." 这种能往上走的名字。
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_SESSION_MAX = 64
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@@ -64,6 +68,13 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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# 不设时按请求的 Host 拼
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public_url: str = ""
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# --- 安全响应头(app/web_security.py)---
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# 允许哪些站点用 iframe 嵌整站(同站的门户,如 https://portal.example.com),逗号分隔。本站自己总是允许的。
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# 不设时只有本站能嵌(frame-ancestors 'self',另加 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN)
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frame_ancestors: Annotated[list[str], NoDecode] = []
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# 分享页(/s)允许被哪些站点嵌,逗号分隔,写法同上。分享页只认这一项,不认上面那一项
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embed_origins: Annotated[list[str], NoDecode] = []
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# --- 沙箱 ---
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sandbox_backend: str = "auto" # auto | microvm | seatbelt | bubblewrap | local | off
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sandbox_timeout: int = 30
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@@ -121,7 +132,8 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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"https://223.5.5.5/resolve",
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]
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@field_validator("http_tool_allowlist", "http_tool_fake_ip_ranges", "http_tool_doh_urls", mode="before")
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@field_validator("http_tool_allowlist", "http_tool_fake_ip_ranges", "http_tool_doh_urls", "frame_ancestors",
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"embed_origins", mode="before")
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@classmethod
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def _comma_list(cls, value: object) -> object:
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# 环境变量里写逗号分隔;也兼容 JSON 数组的写法
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@@ -134,6 +146,24 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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return [part.strip() for part in text.split(",") if part.strip()]
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return value
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@field_validator("frame_ancestors", "embed_origins")
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@classmethod
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def _valid_origins(cls, value: list[str], info: Any) -> list[str]:
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# 只收「协议://主机[:端口]」,主机可以写 *.example.com。路径、裸 *、没写协议的写错了启动时就报出来,别到嵌入
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# 失败(或者整站被谁都能嵌)才发现。'self' 本来就有,写了也不重复
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name = f"AGENTLAB_{(info.field_name or '').upper()}"
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out: list[str] = []
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for raw in value:
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item = raw.strip().rstrip("/")
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if item == "'self'":
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continue
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scheme, _, host = item.partition("://")
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if scheme.lower() not in ("http", "https") or not _ORIGIN_HOST.fullmatch(host):
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raise ValueError(f"{name} 里的「{raw}」需要写成「协议://主机」(可以带端口),例如 https://portal.example.com")
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if (origin := f"{scheme.lower()}://{host.lower()}") not in out:
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out.append(origin)
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return out
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@field_validator("auth_cookie_secure", mode="before")
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@classmethod
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def _blank_is_auto(cls, value: object) -> object:
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@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ from app.core.config import settings
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from app.db.base import init_db
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from app.engine.runner import run_manager
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from app.seed import seed_defaults
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from app.web_security import SecurityHeaders
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logging.basicConfig(
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level=logging.INFO,
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@@ -192,6 +193,8 @@ app.add_middleware(
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allow_methods=["*"],
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allow_headers=["*"],
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)
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# 安全响应头(app/web_security.py):最后加、在最外层,CORS 预检和登录检查自己回的 401 / 403 也带上
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app.add_middleware(SecurityHeaders)
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# 路由级权限(§3.12)。关登录时这些依赖全部放行;开了登录,中间件先挡掉没登录的,这里再按角色和运行挡
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_BUILDER = [require_role("builder")]
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+10
-1
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@
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- /api 下不存在的路径照旧是 JSON 404。排除 /api 写在路由的路径规则里,不在处理函数里判断——
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否则 POST /api/不存在 会因为「路径对上了、方法不对」变成 405;
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- 只注册 GET / HEAD 的 HTTP 路由,WebSocket 不经过这里;
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- index.html 不缓存,发版后刷新即生效;assets/ 下的文件名带内容哈希,长缓存。
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- index.html 不缓存,发版后刷新即生效;assets/ 下的文件名带内容哈希,长缓存;
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- index.html 另带严格 script-src 的上报策略(Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only):启动时按构建产物里的内联脚本算
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sha256(web_security.script_policy),只上报、不拦。其余安全头由 web_security 的中间件统一补。
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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@@ -20,6 +22,8 @@ from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
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from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
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from starlette.convertors import Convertor, register_url_convertor
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from app.web_security import REPORT_ONLY_HEADER, script_policy
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_NO_CACHE = "no-cache"
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_IMMUTABLE = "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
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@@ -72,7 +76,12 @@ def mount_web(app: FastAPI, dist: Path) -> None:
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"先构建前端(cd frontend && pnpm build),或者去掉这个设置"
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)
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# 哈希按启动这一刻的 index.html 算:换了构建产物要重启服务,哈希才跟着换(只上报不拦,对不上也只多几条上报)
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page_headers = {"Cache-Control": _NO_CACHE, REPORT_ONLY_HEADER: script_policy(index.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))}
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def respond(target: Path, *, immutable: bool = False) -> FileResponse:
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if target in (index, index.resolve()):
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return FileResponse(target, media_type=_media_type(target), headers=page_headers)
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return FileResponse(
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target,
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media_type=_media_type(target),
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
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"""安全响应头(04 细案 C1):页面不能被别的站点套进 iframe 诱导点击,浏览器不按内容猜类型,链接不把完整地址带给别的站点。
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以前服务端一个安全头都不发:任何站点都能把 AgentLab 嵌进 iframe。同站的门户页面(SameSite=Lax 的会话 cookie 会随请求
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带上)和关登录的部署,都有被点击劫持的可能;也没有一条「允许谁嵌」的白名单可配。
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纯 ASGI 中间件(同 auth/middleware.py,main.py 里加在最外层):在 http.response.start 上补头,WebSocket 不经过它。
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所有 HTTP 响应(页面、/api、登录检查自己回的 401 / 403、CORS 预检)都补:
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- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff;
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- Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin(分享页 /s 用 no-referrer:分享的 key 在地址的 # 后面,本来不随
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Referer 走,这里再收一道);
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- Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors。缺省只有 'self';AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS 列出允许嵌整站的同站门户;分享页
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/s 只认 AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS(分享链接第 3 波才加,路由在那时挂,头的规则先在这里定好);
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- 只有 frame-ancestors 是 'self' 时另加 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN,给不认 CSP 的老浏览器。XFO 写不了白名单,有白名单
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时只发 CSP:两个都发的话,只认 XFO 的老浏览器会把白名单里的门户也拦掉(认 CSP 的浏览器以 frame-ancestors 为准)。
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接口自己设过的同名头(文件下载的 nosniff)不覆盖、不重复。
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严格的 script-src 先只上报、不拦(Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only):页面里有一段首帧前定主题的内联脚本,强制执行
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的话写错一个哈希页面就会先闪一帧深色,构建会不会产出别的内联内容也没核实。所以 mount_web(app/web.py)启动时给构建产物
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index.html 里的内联脚本算 sha256(script_policy),只在页面这一个响应上发;观察一个版本没有误报,再改成强制执行。没配
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上报地址:违规只在浏览器的控制台里看得到。接口返回的 HTML(导出的报告、可验证报告)文件里自带 meta CSP,不发它,也不动。
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HSTS 交给终结 https 的反向代理:这里不知道对外是不是 https、要不要连子域名一起管,发错了浏览器会按 max-age 记很久,
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撤不回来。
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import re
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from typing import Any
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#: 分享页的路径(/s#<分享 key>):只认 /s 这一段,/settings、/studio 不算
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SHARE_PATH = "/s"
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_SELF = "'self'"
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_DEFAULT_REFERRER = b"strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
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_SHARE_REFERRER = b"no-referrer"
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#: 页面里不带 src 的 <script>:要算哈希的内联脚本
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_INLINE_SCRIPT = re.compile(r"<script\b(?![^>]*\bsrc\s*=)[^>]*>(.*?)</script\s*>", re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL)
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REPORT_ONLY_HEADER = "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only"
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def is_share_path(path: str) -> bool:
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return path == SHARE_PATH or path.startswith(SHARE_PATH + "/")
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def frame_policy(origins: list[str]) -> tuple[bytes, bool]:
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"""(CSP 的值, 要不要另加 X-Frame-Options)。origins 是白名单(config 里校验过、去掉了 'self')。"""
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sources = [_SELF, *[o for o in origins if o != _SELF]]
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return f"frame-ancestors {' '.join(sources)}".encode(), len(sources) == 1
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def script_policy(html: str) -> str:
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"""页面的严格 script-src:本站的脚本文件('self')加上页面里每段内联脚本的 sha256(按原文的 UTF-8 字节算,同浏览器)。"""
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hashes = [base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(body.encode()).digest()).decode()
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for body in _INLINE_SCRIPT.findall(html)]
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return " ".join(["script-src", _SELF, *(f"'sha256-{h}'" for h in dict.fromkeys(hashes))])
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class SecurityHeaders:
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"""frame_ancestors / embed_origins 不传时取 core/config 的 AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS、AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS(测试传别的)。"""
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def __init__(self, app: Any, *, frame_ancestors: list[str] | None = None,
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embed_origins: list[str] | None = None) -> None:
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from app.core.config import settings
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self.app = app
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self.site = frame_policy(settings.frame_ancestors if frame_ancestors is None else frame_ancestors)
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self.share = frame_policy(settings.embed_origins if embed_origins is None else embed_origins)
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async def __call__(self, scope: dict[str, Any], receive: Any, send: Any) -> None:
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if scope["type"] != "http":
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await self.app(scope, receive, send)
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return
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share = is_share_path(scope.get("path") or "")
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frame, xfo = self.share if share else self.site
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wanted = [(b"x-content-type-options", b"nosniff"),
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(b"referrer-policy", _SHARE_REFERRER if share else _DEFAULT_REFERRER),
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(b"content-security-policy", frame)]
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if xfo:
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wanted.append((b"x-frame-options", b"SAMEORIGIN"))
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async def send_with_headers(message: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
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if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
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headers = list(message.get("headers") or [])
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present = {name.lower() for name, _ in headers}
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headers += [(name, value) for name, value in wanted if name not in present]
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message = {**message, "headers": headers}
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await send(message)
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await self.app(scope, receive, send_with_headers)
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@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
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"""安全响应头(04 细案 C1):app/web_security.py 的纯 ASGI 中间件,加上 mount_web 给页面算内联脚本的哈希。
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要守住的:
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- 页面、/api 的响应(连同登录检查自己回的 401)都带 nosniff、Referrer-Policy 和 CSP frame-ancestors;
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- frame-ancestors 缺省 'self',只有 'self' 时另加 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN;配了 AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS 白名单时
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以 CSP 为准、不发 XFO(XFO 写不了白名单,两个都发的话老浏览器按 XFO 把白名单里的门户也拦了);
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- 分享页 /s 用 AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS、Referrer-Policy: no-referrer(路由第 3 波才加,头的规则先守住);
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- 严格的 script-src 只发 Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only,只在页面(index.html)上发,哈希就是构建产物里内联
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脚本的 sha256;接口返回的 HTML(导出的报告自带 meta CSP)不带它;
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- 接口自己设过的同名头不覆盖、不重复;WebSocket 不经过它;
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- 白名单写错了启动时就报错。
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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import subprocess
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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import httpx
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import pytest
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from fastapi import APIRouter, FastAPI, WebSocket
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from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, Response
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from pydantic import ValidationError
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from app.core.config import BACKEND_DIR, PROJECT_DIR, Settings
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from app.main import app as main_app
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from app.web_security import SecurityHeaders
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from tests.fakes import auth_env
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THEME = "\n try { document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-theme', 'light') } catch (e) {}\n "
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INDEX = ("<!doctype html><html><head><script>" + THEME + "</script>"
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"<script type=\"module\" crossorigin src=\"/assets/index-AbC123.js\"></script></head>"
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"<body><div id=root></div></body></html>")
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HASH = base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(THEME.encode()).digest()).decode()
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REPORT = ("<!doctype html><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Security-Policy\" content=\"default-src 'none'\">"
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"<script>console.log('report')</script>")
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@pytest.fixture
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def dist(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
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root = tmp_path / "dist"
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(root / "assets").mkdir(parents=True)
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(root / "index.html").write_text(INDEX)
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(root / "assets" / "index-AbC123.js").write_text("console.log('bundle')")
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return root
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def _app(dist: Path | None = None, **config) -> FastAPI:
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app = FastAPI()
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api = APIRouter(prefix="/api")
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@api.get("/ping")
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async def ping() -> dict[str, str]:
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return {"pong": "1"}
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||||
|
||||
@api.get("/report.html")
|
||||
async def report() -> HTMLResponse:
|
||||
return HTMLResponse(REPORT)
|
||||
|
||||
@api.get("/download")
|
||||
async def download() -> Response:
|
||||
# 文件下载自己设了 nosniff(api/files.py):不能再加一份
|
||||
return Response(b"x", headers={"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff", "Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer"})
|
||||
|
||||
@api.websocket("/echo")
|
||||
async def echo(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
|
||||
await ws.accept()
|
||||
await ws.send_text(await ws.receive_text())
|
||||
await ws.close()
|
||||
|
||||
app.include_router(api)
|
||||
if dist is not None:
|
||||
from app.web import mount_web
|
||||
|
||||
mount_web(app, dist)
|
||||
app.add_middleware(SecurityHeaders, **config)
|
||||
return app
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _get(app: FastAPI, path: str) -> httpx.Response:
|
||||
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.ASGITransport(app=app), base_url="http://t") as client:
|
||||
return await client.get(path)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _single(r: httpx.Response, name: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
values = r.headers.get_list(name)
|
||||
assert len(values) <= 1, f"{name} 发了 {len(values)} 份:{values}"
|
||||
return values[0] if values else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_api_and_page_carry_the_defaults(dist: Path) -> None:
|
||||
app = _app(dist, frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[])
|
||||
for path in ("/api/ping", "/api/nope", "/", "/studio", "/assets/index-AbC123.js"):
|
||||
r = await _get(app, path)
|
||||
assert _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff", path
|
||||
assert _single(r, "referrer-policy") == "strict-origin-when-cross-origin", path
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'", path
|
||||
assert _single(r, "x-frame-options") == "SAMEORIGIN", path
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_report_only_script_policy_is_only_on_the_page(dist: Path) -> None:
|
||||
app = _app(dist, frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[])
|
||||
for path in ("/", "/studio", "/runs/abc/evidence"):
|
||||
r = await _get(app, path)
|
||||
assert r.text == INDEX
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy-report-only") == f"script-src 'self' 'sha256-{HASH}'", path
|
||||
# 脚本文件、接口不带;接口返回的 HTML(导出的报告)自带 meta CSP,不加一份对不上哈希的上报策略,正文原样
|
||||
for path in ("/assets/index-AbC123.js", "/api/ping", "/api/report.html"):
|
||||
r = await _get(app, path)
|
||||
assert "content-security-policy-report-only" not in r.headers, path
|
||||
r = await _get(app, "/api/report.html")
|
||||
assert r.text == REPORT
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_whitelist_wins_and_drops_x_frame_options() -> None:
|
||||
app = _app(frame_ancestors=["https://portal.example.com", "https://*.corp.example"], embed_origins=[])
|
||||
r = await _get(app, "/api/ping")
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == \
|
||||
"frame-ancestors 'self' https://portal.example.com https://*.corp.example"
|
||||
assert "x-frame-options" not in r.headers, "有白名单时以 CSP 为准:XFO 写不了白名单"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_share_page_uses_the_embed_origins(dist: Path) -> None:
|
||||
app = _app(dist, frame_ancestors=["https://portal.example.com"], embed_origins=["https://bi.example.org"])
|
||||
for path in ("/s", "/s/", "/s/anything"):
|
||||
r = await _get(app, path)
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self' https://bi.example.org", path
|
||||
assert _single(r, "referrer-policy") == "no-referrer", path
|
||||
assert "x-frame-options" not in r.headers, path
|
||||
# 只认 /s 这一段:/settings、/studio 照整站的规则
|
||||
for path in ("/settings", "/studio", "/share"):
|
||||
r = await _get(app, path)
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self' https://portal.example.com", path
|
||||
assert _single(r, "referrer-policy") == "strict-origin-when-cross-origin", path
|
||||
# 没配嵌入白名单:分享页只能被本站嵌,同样另加 XFO
|
||||
r = await _get(_app(dist, frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[]), "/s")
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'"
|
||||
assert _single(r, "x-frame-options") == "SAMEORIGIN"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_headers_already_set_are_kept() -> None:
|
||||
r = await _get(_app(frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[]), "/api/download")
|
||||
assert _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
|
||||
assert _single(r, "referrer-policy") == "no-referrer"
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_websocket_is_not_touched() -> None:
|
||||
with TestClient(_app(frame_ancestors=[], embed_origins=[])) as client:
|
||||
with client.websocket_connect("/api/echo") as ws:
|
||||
ws.send_text("hi")
|
||||
assert ws.receive_text() == "hi"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_main_app_and_its_own_refusals_carry_the_headers() -> None:
|
||||
"""真实的 app.main:加在最外层,登录检查自己回的 401、CORS 预检也带。"""
|
||||
app = main_app
|
||||
r = await _get(app, "/api/health")
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'"
|
||||
assert _single(r, "x-frame-options") == "SAMEORIGIN" and _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
|
||||
await auth_env.reset()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
await auth_env.turn_on_local()
|
||||
r = await _get(app, "/api/workflows")
|
||||
assert r.status_code == 401 and r.json()["code"] == "auth_required"
|
||||
assert _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
|
||||
assert _single(r, "content-security-policy") == "frame-ancestors 'self'"
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
await auth_env.reset()
|
||||
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.ASGITransport(app=app), base_url="http://t") as client:
|
||||
r = await client.options("/api/health", headers={"Origin": "http://localhost:5273",
|
||||
"Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET"})
|
||||
assert r.status_code == 200 and _single(r, "x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_origin_lists_parse_and_bad_entries_fail_at_startup(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv("AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS", raising=False)
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv("AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS", raising=False)
|
||||
assert Settings().frame_ancestors == [] and Settings().embed_origins == []
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS", " https://portal.example.com/ , https://*.corp.example,'self'")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS", '["http://bi.example.org:8080"]')
|
||||
got = Settings()
|
||||
assert got.frame_ancestors == ["https://portal.example.com", "https://*.corp.example"], "末尾的 / 去掉,'self' 本来就有"
|
||||
assert got.embed_origins == ["http://bi.example.org:8080"]
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv("AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS")
|
||||
# 只收「协议://主机[:端口]」:路径、通配一切、没写协议、'none' 这类写法启动时就报出来,别到嵌入失败才发现
|
||||
for bad in ("*", "portal.example.com", "https://portal.example.com/app", "ftp://portal.example.com", "'none'",
|
||||
"https://", "https://portal.example.com?x=1"):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS", bad)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS"):
|
||||
Settings()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_deploy_env_documents_both_lists() -> None:
|
||||
text = (PROJECT_DIR / "deploy" / "agentlab.env").read_text()
|
||||
assert "# AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS=" in text and "# AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS=" in text
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_PROBE = r"""
|
||||
import asyncio, json, httpx
|
||||
from app.main import app
|
||||
|
||||
async def main():
|
||||
t = httpx.ASGITransport(app=app)
|
||||
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=t, base_url="http://t") as c:
|
||||
out = {}
|
||||
for p in ("/", "/api/health"):
|
||||
r = await c.get(p)
|
||||
out[p] = {k: r.headers.get(k) for k in ("content-security-policy", "x-frame-options",
|
||||
"content-security-policy-report-only")}
|
||||
print(json.dumps(out))
|
||||
|
||||
asyncio.run(main())
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_main_app_reads_the_whitelist_and_hashes_the_page(dist: Path, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
|
||||
"""真实的 app.main:环境变量里的白名单生效、不发 XFO;托管页面时 index.html 带上报策略。settings、app 都是模块级
|
||||
单例,起一个子进程导入。"""
|
||||
env = {**os.environ, "AGENTLAB_DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "data"), "AGENTLAB_WEB_DIST": str(dist),
|
||||
"AGENTLAB_SECRET_KEY": "test-only-not-a-real-key", "AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS": "https://portal.example.com"}
|
||||
proc = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", _PROBE], cwd=BACKEND_DIR, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True,
|
||||
timeout=120)
|
||||
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr[-2000:]
|
||||
out = json.loads(proc.stdout.strip().splitlines()[-1])
|
||||
for path in ("/", "/api/health"):
|
||||
assert out[path]["content-security-policy"] == "frame-ancestors 'self' https://portal.example.com", path
|
||||
assert out[path]["x-frame-options"] is None, path
|
||||
assert out["/"]["content-security-policy-report-only"] == f"script-src 'self' 'sha256-{HASH}'"
|
||||
assert out["/api/health"]["content-security-policy-report-only"] is None
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +31,17 @@ BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
|
||||
# 会话 cookie 是否带 Secure:留空按请求是不是 https 决定;反向代理终结了 https 时填 true
|
||||
# AGENTLAB_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- 嵌入(可选)----
|
||||
# 默认只有 AgentLab 自己能把页面放进 iframe(响应头 Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self',另加
|
||||
# X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN),别的站点嵌进去会被浏览器拦下,防点击劫持。HSTS 不在这里加,交给终结 https 的反向代理。
|
||||
# 同站的门户(和 AgentLab 在同一个可注册域名下,比如 portal.example.internal 和 agentlab.example.internal)要嵌整站时,
|
||||
# 把门户的地址写在下面,逗号分隔,只写 协议://主机[:端口],主机可以写 *.example.internal。填了之后只发
|
||||
# frame-ancestors、不再发 X-Frame-Options。登录用的 cookie 只随同站的请求带上,跨站的门户嵌整站登录不了。
|
||||
# 写错了(带路径、没写协议、只写 *)服务启动时报错。
|
||||
# AGENTLAB_FRAME_ANCESTORS=https://portal.example.internal
|
||||
# 分享页(/s)允许被哪些站点嵌,写法同上。分享页只认这一项、不认上面那一项。分享链接还没有上线,现在填了不起作用
|
||||
# AGENTLAB_EMBED_ORIGINS=https://bi.example.internal
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- 数据 ----
|
||||
# 数据目录:数据库、执行断点、上传的文件、沙箱工作区,还有加密密钥 .secret_key 都在这里。
|
||||
# 要备份的就是这个目录(丢了 .secret_key,存进去的 API Key 就解不开了)。
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user